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a b s t r a c t
Theory of mind (ToM) refers to the capacity to infer one’s own and other persons’ mental states. ToM
abilities are compromised in schizophrenia, in association with dysfunctional activity in predominantly
prefrontal brain regions. Prior behavioral studies have also suggested ToM deﬁcits in healthy individuals
with psychosis proneness (PP), although no study to date had investigated the associated neural mech-
anisms in such a sample. Here we used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to compare brain
activation of subjectswith high versus low scores on positive-dimension PP and a ToM task. The ToM task
involved ﬁrst and second order attribution of cognitive and affective mental states to a cartoon character
based on verbal and eye-gaze cues. No between-group differences were found on behavioral perfor-MRI
refrontal cortex
chizophrenia
mance. fMRI analyses revealed a group interaction in anterior prefrontal cortex (BA 10), with the high PP
group showing signiﬁcantlymore activity thereof, relative to the lowPP, during second ordermentalizing
than during ﬁrst order mentalizing. Further between-group differences were observed in dorsomedial
and lateral prefrontal regions (BA 46/9), with the high PP group also showing greater activation during
second order mentalizing. These results suggest that subjects with positive-dimension PP require more
activation of prefrontal areas to adequately mentalize. Differences in the neural mechanisms underlying
withToM might be associated
. Introduction
Theory of mind (ToM) refers to the ability to attribute mental
tates to others, such as beliefs and desires, enabling us to explain
nd predict their behavior in order to adaptively function in a social
nvironment. ToM disruptions have been consistently reported in
chizophrenia (Bora, Yucel, & Pantelis, 2009). Such deﬁcits have
elevant implications for the patients, as they are thought to con-
ribute to impaired social functioning (Brüne, 2005), and to play
role in the genesis of psychotic symptoms of the positive (Frith,
992; Frith & Corcoran, 1996) as well as of the negative and dis-
rganized dimensions (Sarfati, Hardy-Baylé, Brunet, & Widlöcher,
999; Sprong, Schothorst, Vos, Hox, & van Engeland, 2007). From
neurophysiological point of view, key regions for ToM in the
ealthy brain have been identiﬁed in the temporal poles, the pos-
erior superior temporal sulcus, andmost robustly in the prefrontal
ortex (PFC) (Carrington & Bailey, 2009; Singer, 2006). In patients
ith schizophrenia, a number of imaging studies have documented
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abnormal hemodynamic response in several regions involved in
ToM, such as medial and lateral portions of the PFC, relative to
healthy controls (Brunet-Gouet & Decety, 2006).
The substantial body of evidence for ToM abnormalities in
schizophrenia has led to the hypothesis that, albeit more severe
in acute phases, mentalizing impairments might be a trait charac-
teristic of the disorder (Bora et al., 2009). However, this hypothesis
is still a matter of debate (Pousa, Ruiz, & David, 2008). Impaired
ToM performance on the behavioral level has been observed in
remitted patients (Bora et al., 2009; Sprong et al., 2007), ﬁrst-
episode schizophrenia (Bertrand, Sutton, Achim, Malla, & Lepage,
2007; Kettle, O’Brien-Simpson, & Allen, 2008), subjects in prodro-
mal phases (Chung, Kang, Shin, Yoo, & Kwon, 2008; although see
Couture, Penn, Addington, Woods, & Perkins, 2008 for lack of sig-
niﬁcant differences), subjects at genetic risk (Irani et al., 2006;
Marjoram, Miller, et al., 2006), and healthy subjects who have been
psychometrically deﬁned as being prone to psychosis (Langdon &
Coltheart, 1999, 2001, 2004; Meyer & Shean, 2006; Pickup, 2006;
Platek, Critton, Myers, & Gallup, 2003; Platek & Gallup, 2002;
although see Fernyhough, Jones, Whittle, Waterhouse, & Bentall,
2008; Fyfe, Williams, Mason, & Pickup, 2008; Jahshan & Sergi, 2007
for lack of differences). In addition, support for the trait hypothe-
sis has been recently suggested by a meta-analysis of ToM studies
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lthough the accumulated ﬁndings of ToM deﬁcits in remitted and
on-remitted patients suggest that there is indeed a trait-related
oM impairment in schizophrenia, more careful research is needed
o investigate this ability in symptom-free patients and people at
isk for developing psychosis.
Schizotypy describes a continuum of personality characteris-
ics and experiences related to psychosis in the general population
Claridge et al., 1996). Schizotypal traits can be psychometri-
ally identiﬁed in healthy people (Claridge, 1997; Lenzenweger,
994; Stefanis et al., 2002). There is evidence to suggest that
chizotypal traits fall into a factor organization similar to that
n schizophrenia, consisting of positive (e.g., magical ideation,
erceptual aberration), negative (e.g., physical anhedonia, social
nhedonia), anddisorganized (e.g., disorganized speech andbehav-
or) symptomdimensions (Claridgeet al., 1996;Kerns, 2006; Liddle,
987). In fact, several studies that have investigated unaffected
elatives of patients and samples from the general population pro-
ide compelling evidence for continuity between subclinical (e.g.,
chizotypal traits) and clinical (e.g., schizophrenia) forms of psy-
hosis. For instance, Vollema, Sitskoorn, Appels, and Kahn (2002)
tudied relatives of patients with schizophrenia and reported
hat the risk percentage for the development of schizophrenia
as reﬂected in the score on the positive-dimension scale of a
chizotypal personality questionnaire, which suggests that pos-
tive schizotypy reﬂects the biological–genetic vulnerability to
chizophrenia. A large general population twin study investigating
685 individuals, including 1438 complete twin pairs, found evi-
ence for familial resemblance and a genetic effect for both positive
ndnegative schizotypydimensions asmeasuredpsychometrically
Hay et al., 2001), which represented a replication of the results
ound with clinical samples. Furthermore, Fanous, Gardner, Walsh,
nd Kendler (2001) reported that positive symptoms in probands
ith non-affective psychosiswere predictive of positive schizotypy
n the relatives, while negative symptoms in the probands were
redictive of negative schizotypy, which further suggests continu-
ty of psychotic symptoms. Thus, there is evidence for familial, and
ossibly genetic, homotypy of these psychosis dimensions (Myin-
ermeys, Krabbendam, & van Os, 2003).
Schizotypal traits are therefore thought to constitute a range of
nduring, biologically determined, personality and cognitive traits
hat predispose to schizophrenia (Chapman, Chapman, Kwapil,
ckblad, & Zinser, 1994; Lenzenweger, 2006). The detection of
chizotypal traits in healthy subjects is used as an indicator of
sychosis proneness (PP) (Meyer & Hautzinger, 2002), which is
onceptualized as a subclinical manifestation of the same underly-
ng biological factors of schizophrenia-spectrum disorders (Johns
van Os, 2001; Van Os, Linscott, Myin-Germeys, Delespaul,
Krabbendam, 2009). Indeed, several prospective studies have
hown that about 10% of subjects psychometrically identiﬁed as
sychosis-prone will go on to develop a schizophrenia-spectrum
isorder (Chapman et al., 1994; Hanssen, Bak, Bijl, Vollebergh, &
an Os, 2005; Meehl, 1990; see Van Os et al., 2009 for review).
high score on a questionnaire measuring schizotypal personal-
ty traits can therefore be conceptualized as a phenotypic marker
f risk for schizophrenia (Chapman et al., 1994; Squires-Wheeler,
kodol, & Erlenmeyer-Kimling, 1991). In particular, scales measur-
ng positive schizotypy demonstrate characteristics of vulnerability
ndicators to schizophrenia and schizophrenia-spectrum disorders
Horan, Blanchard, Clark, & Green, 2008).
Research in PP has revealed impairments on measures of
motional, social and cognitive functioning parallel to those of
chizophrenia patients (Henry et al., 2009; Horan, Reise, Subotnik,
entura, & Nuechterlein, 2008; Mohanty et al., 2008; Mohanty
t al., 2005; Van’t Wout, Aleman, Kessels, Larøi, & Kahn, 2004),
s well as in brain function and structure (Modinos, Mechelli, et
l., 2010). Thus far there is evidence to suggest a mentalizinggia 48 (2010) 3715–3724
disturbance in people with PP (see Sprong et al., 2007), in line
with the notion that it may be an underlying marker of vulner-
ability. Such evidence has been commonly provided by studies
which have not differentiated between symptomdimensions in PP,
with the exception of Pickup (2006), who reported signiﬁcant ToM
deﬁcits in association with the positive rather than with the neg-
ative dimension. Moreover, subjects with positive-dimension PP
(experiencing e.g., unusual beliefs and aberrant perceptions) show
elevated social anxiety andpoorer social functioning (Brown, Silvia,
Myin-Germeys, Lewandowski, & Kwapil, 2008; Kwapil, Barrantes-
Vidal, & Silvia, 2008), which is thought to be related to ToMdeﬁcits.
Patients with schizophrenia show functional (see Brunet-Gouet
& Decety, 2006 for review) and structural brain abnormalities
in ToM-relevant regions (Benedetti et al., 2009; Herold et al.,
2009; Yamada et al., 2007). Interestingly, a previous fMRI study
in individuals at genetic risk for schizophrenia reported abnormal
brain activation in prefrontal regions relevant to ToM processing
(Marjoram, Job, et al., 2006). In fact, it has been recently suggested
that functional and structural abnormalities within brain regions
dedicated to self and other-referential processing may be impli-
cated early in the pathophysiology of the disorder (Nelson et al.,
2009). To date, however, no study has examined brain activation
during ToM in psychosis-prone individuals. Research on such a
sample has several strengths, as it allows for the study of mech-
anisms relevant to psychotic experiences without the confounding
factors of medication, illness duration, institutionalization or other
consequences of the clinical disorder.
Here we used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to
examine brain function associated with ToM in a group of indi-
viduals with high positive-dimension PP, comparing them with a
group of subjects with low positive-dimension PP. In light of recent
evidence that tasks involving inference regarding cognitive men-
tal states and tasks involving inference regarding affective mental
states are differentially impaired in individuals with schizophrenia
(Shamay-Tsoory, Aharon-Peretz, & Levkovitz, 2007), we adapted a
task that had previously allowed for the study of these components
in schizophrenia (Shamay-Tsoory, Shur, et al., 2007). We tested
the hypothesis that high positive-dimension PP individuals would
show differences in activation, relative to low positive-dimension
PP individuals, in prefrontal regions involved in ToM during the
correct attribution of mental states, consistent with the one avail-
able fMRI study inhigh-risk relatives of patientswith schizophrenia
(Marjoram, Job, et al., 2006).
2. Materials and methods
2.1. Participants
Sixhundredundergraduate studentswere screenedwith thepositive subscaleof
the Community Assessment of Psychic Experiences questionnaire (CAPE; Stefanis et
al., 2002). Theyall gavewritten informedconsent to complete theCAPE.According to
their CAPE scores, 36 subjects were ultimately recruited for the actual fMRI exper-
iment. Eighteen right-handed individuals with a high score on the CAPE positive
dimension (above the 75th percentile, as recommended in Konings, Bak, Hanssen,
van Os, & Krabbendam, 2006) were assigned to the “high PP” group (10 men, mean
age 19.8±1.9 years, range 18–24,meanCAPEpositive-dimension score 1.74±0.13),
and 18 right-handed individuals scoring below the 25th percentile of the distribu-
tion were included in the low psychosis-prone group (“low PP”; 10 men, mean age
21±2.8 years, range 18–27,meanCAPEpositive-dimension score 1.12±0.04). Thus,
groups were matched for age, sex, handedness, and level of education. These sub-
jects were screened for exclusion criteria using a self-report checklist for healthy
subjects, comprising the following points: (1) no personal history of neurological
or psychiatric illness; (2) no family history of psychotic or neurological illness in
ﬁrst-degree relatives; (3) no use of illicit substances; and (4) no changes in overall
level of functioning, including academic performance over the past 6 months. All 36
participants gavewritten informed consent for participating in the fMRI experiment
after a detailed explanation of the experimental protocol, approved by the Medical
Ethical Committee of the University Medical Center Groningen. The procedures fol-
lowed were in accordance with the ethical standards of the responsible committee
on human experimentation and with the Helsinki Declaration of 1975, as revised in
1983.




























tig. 1. Examples of task trials for each condition and order. Text translates to, from
he ﬂower that wants” (second order cognitive); “Jan loves ” (ﬁrst order affecti
hysical); “Jan has the same toy as ” (second order physical).
.2. Psychosis proneness questionnaire
The CAPE was used to measure PP. This instrument was chosen based on
he following characteristics: (1) good validity and reliability for the assess-
ent of schizotypal features in the general population (Hanssen et al., 2005), (2)
ood concurrent validity with interview-based measures (Konings et al., 2006),
3) developed and standardized on a Dutch population. A detailed description
f its psychometric properties and administration procedure can be found else-
here (Stefanis et al., 2002). In brief, this is a 42-item self-report questionnaire
easuring life-time frequency of attenuated psychotic symptoms, on a 4-point
cale of “never”, “sometimes”, “often” and “nearly always”. Konings et al. (2006)
eported high effect sizes for the internal stability of the CAPE (0.6–0.8), indi-
ating that self-reported dimensions of psychosis proneness at baseline were
trongly associated with the same dimensions at follow-up. Thus, the time lag
etween completion of the CAPE and time of scanning would not affect the ﬁnd-
ngs.
Originally, the CAPE was based on a three-factor structure of positive, negative
nd depressive factors. For the purpose of the present study,we only used the scores
n the positive factor.We followed the notion that someof the positive symptomsof
chizophrenia reﬂect an impairment in the ability to infer themental states of others
Frith&Corcoran, 1996), and onprior evidence that impaired indices of ToMare pre-
icted by schizotypal experiences analogous to positive symptoms of schizophrenia
nhealthy subjects (Pickup, 2006), and by attenuated positive symptoms in relatives
f patients with schizophrenia (Marjoram, Miller, et al., 2006). Thus, we measured
ositive factor schizotypal traits (e.g., unusual experiences, oddbeliefs),which relate
o the positive dimension of the schizotypy concept (Claridge et al., 1996). The posi-
ive dimension of the CAPE is signiﬁcantly correlated with the positive dimension of
he Structured Interview for Schizotypy, Revised (SIR–R) (ˇ =0.52, t=8.48,p=0.000),to right and top to bottom: “Jan thinks of ” (ﬁrst order cognitive); “Jan thinks of
an loves the fruit that loves” (second order affective); “Jan is near ” (ﬁrst order
and the positive dimension of the Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale (BPRS) (ˇ =0.27,
t=3.54, p=0.000) (Konings et al., 2006).
2.3. Task and experimental design
The task was based on that of Shamay-Tsoory, Aharon-Peretz, et al. (2006) and
Shamay-Tsoory, Shur, et al. (2006), and involved the ability to judge mental states
based on verbal and eye-gaze cues. The task has been validated before and has been
shown to be positively correlated with verbal measures of ToM such as false belief
stories (Shamay-Tsoory & Aharon-Peretz, 2007). The task was adapted for the fMRI
environment as a mixed experimental paradigm, comprising ﬁrst and second order
mental state attributionusingcolor cartoon images. The stimuliwere furtherdivided
into three conditions: cognitive, affective and physical.
In short, the task consisted of 54 trials, each showing a cartoon outline of a
face (named Jan) and four colored pictures of objects belonging to a single category
(e.g., fruits, chairs) or faces, one in each corner of the computer screen (see stimuli
examples in Fig. 1). The subject was required to indicate the correct answer (the
image to which Jan was referring), based on a sentence that appeared at the top of
the screen and available cues, such as Jan’s eye gaze, Jan’s facial expression, or the
face’s (the one to which Jan is referring) eye gaze and facial expression. Subjects
were instructed to select the correct picture using a four-button response box as
fast as they could. There were two main conditions: “theory of mind” (40 trials) and
“physical” (14 trials) requiring a ﬁrst (24 trials) or second (30 trials) order inference.
The theory of mind condition involved mental inferences, while the physical con-
dition required a choice based on a physical attribute of the character (thus serving
as control condition, to ensure that the subject understands the task). In the ﬁrst
order physical condition the subject was asked to refer to Jan’s location (Jan is near
), while in the second order condition the subject was asked to point to the same
3718 G. Modinos et al. / Neuropsychologia 48 (2010) 3715–3724


































wondition were randomly presented. FO blocks were followed by ﬁve second order (
ondition were randomly presented. Blocks were intermixed with 20-s rest perio
entence on top of the screen and to indicate which of the four response options w
bject Jan and the character have (Jan has the same fruit as has). In the theory of
ind conditions, the sentences could be, for example, “Jan is thinking of ”, or “Jan
oves ”. In the second order condition, the four stimuli consisted of face images
nd the choice of the correct response required understanding of the interaction
etween each of these ﬁgures and Jan’s mental state. For example, “Jan is thinking
f the toy that wants”, and “Jan loves the toy that loves”. Subjects’ performance
as rated for accuracy and reaction time.
Speciﬁcally, the conditions were as follows:
First order cognitive condition (FOCOG) in which responding to the sentence on
top the image required attribution of a cognitive mental state to Jan.
First order affective condition (FOAFF) inwhich responding to the sentence on top
the image required attribution of an affective mental state to Jan.
Second order cognitive condition (SOCOG) in which responding to the sentence
on top the image required attribution of a cognitive mental state to Jan about
another character’s mental state.
Second order affective condition (SOAFF) in which responding to the sentence
on top the image required attribution of an affective mental state to Jan about
another character’s mental state.
First and second order physical conditions (FOPHY; SOPHY) did not require ToM
abilities.
The experiment began with ﬁrst order (FO) mentalizing blocks. There were four
O blocks in total, each including six trials. All trials displayed a verbal cue on top of
he screen, to which the subjects responded by indicating the correct answer (the
mage Jan was referring to) using a four-button response box. Each trial was shown
or 5 s, and trial conditions (FOCOG, FOAFF, FOPHY)were presented in randomorder
ithin each block. Blocks were intermixed with 20-s rest periods (ﬁxation cross).
ext, second order (SO) mentalizing blocks were presented. There were ﬁve SO
locks in total, each including six trials. These images were also shown for 5 s, and
rial conditions (SOCOG, SOAFF, SOPHY) were, again, randomly presented within
ach block. Blocks were intermixed with 20-s rest periods (ﬁxation cross). There
ere 2 rest periods more (ﬁxation cross) at the beginning and at the end of the
xperiment, representing a total of 9 experimental blocks and 10 ﬁxation periods.
hus, this was a mixed design, with FO and SO conditions presented as blocks, and
ithin each block COG, AFF and PHY trials randomly presented as events. Total
uration of the experiment was about 9min. All participants underwent a training
ession on the task immediately before fMRI scanning, including 12 trials (see Fig. 2)..4. Imaging
Participants were scanned on a 3T Philips Intera MR scanner (Philips Medi-
al Systems, Best, The Netherlands). E-Prime was used to present the task to the
ubjects during scanning. Functional MRI data comprised 240 volumes acquired
ith a T2*-weighted gradient echo-planar imaging (EPI) sequence, using a sense-8ocks, also of 30 s each, during which six trials of the cognitive, affective and physical
sisting of a ﬁxation cross. During fMRI scanning, subjects were asked to read the
ect.
head coil. Thirty-seven echo planar images per volume sensitive to blood-oxygen
level dependent (BOLD) contrast were obtained (TR=2000ms, TE=35ms, in-
plane resolution=3.5mm×3.5mm, ﬁeld of view (FOV) =224mm). Slices were
acquired interleaved in alignment with the anterior commissure-posterior com-
missure plane, with a thickness of 3.5mm (no gap). In addition, high-resolution
T1-weighted 3D fast-ﬁeld echo (FFE) sequences were obtained for anatomical refer-
ence (160 slices, TR=25ms, TE=4.6ms, slice-thickness =1mm, matrix =256×256;
FOV=26 cm; voxel size, 1mm×1mm×1mm).
2.5. Behavioral analysis
Performance was rated for accuracy and reaction time (RT). Accuracy was
scored on a binomial scale (1 = correct, 0 = incorrect). Since Second Order trials were
expected to be more cognitively demanding than First Order trials (Samson, 2009),
we analyzed First and Second Order data separately. Accuracy scores and RT were
subjected to separate 3 (Condition: cognitive, affective, physical) by 2 (Group: low
PP, high PP) repeated measures ANOVA for each Order type, in SPSS.
2.6. Imaging analysis
Data were preprocessed and analyzed using SPM5 (Wellcome Department of
Imaging Neuroscience; http://www.ﬁl.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/), running under Matlab
7.4. (TheMathWorks Inc.). Standard pre-processingwas applied, ﬁrstwith slice time
correction, and then realignment to the ﬁrst volume to correct for interscan motion
artifacts. After realignment, a mean EPI image was created, which was co-registered
with the structural T1 image. Subsequently, imageswere spatially normalized to the
standard stereotactic space deﬁned by the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI)
template. Functional images were then smoothed with a 3D isotropic 8-mm full-
width/half-maximum (FWHM)Gaussian kernel. Low-frequency noisewas removed
by applying a high-pass ﬁlter (cut-off of 128 s) to the fMRI time-series at each voxel.
Signiﬁcant hemodynamic changes for each condition were examined using the
General Linear Model (Friston et al., 1995). For each condition (FOCOG, FOAFF,
FOPHY, SOCOG, SOAFF, SOPHY), the brain response was modeled by convolv-
ing each individual trial (5 s) with canonical hemodynamic response function. To
identify activity in regions related to ToM conditions, we computed t-contrasts
of each ToM condition to the respective Physical condition (e.g., FOCOG>FOPHY;
SOAFF>SOPHY). Following the purpose to examine activity in cerebral areas associ-
ated with the correct attribution of mental states, based on the need to ensure that
we were as unequivocally as possible capturing activity related to ToM as opposed
to e.g. distraction or other unrelated processes that could have led to errors, only
correct trials were modeled for the fMRI analysis.
Next, each individual contrast image was entered into a second-level ran-
dom effects analysis to examine task-related activations across groups, as well as
between-group differences (repeated measures ANOVA). We aimed at investigat-
ing the effects of Group (low PP, high PP), Condition (COG, AFF), Order (FO, SO), and
interactions Group by Condition and Group by Order. A conjunction analysis of COG






































Behavioral results (reaction time and accuracy) for each study group.
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nd AFF (versus PHY, across groups) was conducted to test for common theory of
ind activation relative to the control condition.
Finally, we tested the hypothesis that SO trials would be more cogni-
ively demanding than FO trials (Samson, 2009) by comparing, across groups,
eural activation associated with SO relative to that associated with FO
(SOCOG+SOAFF) > (FOCOG+FOAFF)]. For the sake of completeness, we also exam-
ned the reversed contrast, FO>SO [(FOCOG+FOAFF) > (SOCOG+SOAFF)].
Statistical maps were thresholded at a level of p<0.005 uncorrected, and voxel-
ise data were corrected for multiple comparisons by spatial extent of contiguous
uprathreshold individual voxels atp<0.05 fora cluster, in linewith theoneprevious
MRI study on ToM in subjects at genetic risk for psychosis (Marjoram, Job, et al.,
006). Coordinates are reported in MNI (Montreal Neurological Institute) space.
rain regions were identiﬁed with the Anatomical Automatic Labeling Toolbox for
PM (Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 2002).
. Results
.1. Behavioral
A Condition (COG, AFF, PHY) by Group (high PP, low PP)
epeated measures ANOVA was conducted on the accuracy scores
n each trial for each Order type. In First Order trials, there
as no main effect of Condition (F(2,68) =2.664, p=0.092), Group
F(1,34) =1.197, p=0.282), or Group by Condition interaction
F(2,68) <1, ns). A repeated measures ANOVA on RT revealed no
ain effect ofGroup (F(1,34) <1, ns), orGroupbyCondition interac-
ion (F(2,68) =2.015, p=0.147). There was a signiﬁcant main effect
f Condition (F(2,68) =9.954, p<0.001). Bonferroni post-hoc cor-
ection revealed that PHY trials were quicker than COG (p=0.019)
nd AFF trials (p=0.001).
In Second Order trials, the ANOVA on accuracy scores revealed
o main effect of Condition (F(2,68) =1.479, p=0.235), Group
F(1,34) <1, ns) or Group by Condition interaction (F(2,68) <1, ns).
ith regard to RT, the ANOVA revealed no main effect of Group
F(1,34) <1, ns). However, there was a signiﬁcant main effect of
ondition (F(2,68) =108.506, p<0.001). Bonferroni post-hoc cor-
ection revealed that PHY trials were quicker than COG (p<0.001)
nd AFF trials (p<0.001). There was also a signiﬁcant Group by
ondition interaction (F(2,68) =3.329, p=0.042), although post-
oc analysis of between-group differences for each condition did
ot reach signiﬁcance (SOCOG, p=0.230; SOAFF, p=0.796; SOPHY,
=0.073). See Table 1 for a complete visualization of behavioral
ata.
able 2
rain regions showing a signiﬁcant effect of factor condition across groups.
Condition Side Area






















ctivations were signiﬁcant at a threshold of p<0.05, cluster-level corrected for multiple
, right.SOPHY 82.4 85.2
PP, psychosis proneness; RT, reaction time; SD, standard deviation.
3.2. Functional MRI
3.2.1. Effect of Group (low PP, high PP)
A voxel-wise repeated measures ANOVA revealed no signiﬁcant
activations as effect of group surviving the statistical threshold of
p<0.05 cluster-level corrected for multiple comparisons.
3.2.2. Effect of Condition (COG, AFF)
There was a signiﬁcant effect of COG cartoons, relative to AFF
cartoons, in righthemispheric prefrontal regions (superior, inferior,
and middle frontal gyrus, anterior cingulate cortex), right anterior
insula, and the supramarginal gyrus bilaterally. The AFF condition
produced activations, across groups, in the right cuneus, left hip-
pocampus, and the fusiformgyrus andcerebellumbilaterally. These
activations are displayed in Table 2. There was no signiﬁcant Group
by Condition interaction.
A conjunction analysis of (COG>PHY) + (AFF>PHY) revealed
common mentalizing activation, relative to the physical condition,
in prefrontal regions (middle frontal gyrus, medial frontal gyrus),
left precentral gyrus, the cerebellum bilaterally, left superior tem-
poral gyrus, and left inferior parietal gyrus (Table 2).
Z score x y z
ntal gyrus 4.47 22 6 54
tal gyrus 4.12 48 10 12
3.48 30 22 6
tal gyrus 3.60 30 44 16
nal gyrus 3.71 52 −32 40
nal gyrus 2.99 −60 −30 28
gulate cortex 3.02 0 36 2
5.03 16 −92 10
rus 5.01 24 −48 −12
rus 4.31 −24 −48 −12
3.50 6 −52 −46
us 2.92 −26 −22 −14
tal gyrus 4.60 54 28 26
tal gyrus 4.44 −36 10 26
yrus 4.13 −48 6 30
3.87 30 −64 −30
3.52 −8 −78 −32
poral gyrus 3.41 −56 −60 14
etal lobe 2.98 −28 −58 38
tal gyrus 2.77 −4 26 46
comparisons. Coordinates are in Montreal Neurologic Institute (MNI) space. L, left;
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Table 3
Brain regions showing a signiﬁcant effect of factor order across groups.
Order Side Area Z score x x y
First Superior medial gyrus 6.45 0 62 0
L Calcarine gyrus 5.97 −4 −90 14
R Supplementary motor area 5.25 4 −24 56
R Hippocampus/amygdala 5.01 26 −20 −18
L Posterior cingulate gyrus 3.78 −6 −52 24
L Temporal pole 3.66 −48 8 −34
L Precuneus 3.21 −20 −50 10
Second R Inferior parietal lobe 7.80 38 −46 42
R Middle frontal gyrus/inferior frontal gyrus 7.37 48 36 30
L Cerebellum 6.08 −12 −76 −32
R Cerebellum 3.52 16 −40 −44





















Rig. 3. Panel (A) displays anterior prefrontal region (BA10) showing signiﬁcant BOL
ndOrder (First Order >Physical, SecondOrder >Physical). Panel (B) showsmean BO
ecruited this region to a signiﬁcantly greater extent for Second Order trials, relativ
or multiple comparisons. FO: ﬁrst order; SO: second order.
.2.3. Effect of Order (FO, SO)
There was a signiﬁcant effect of FO in the superior medial gyrus,
he right supplementary motor area, hippocampus/amygdala, the
eft calcarine gyrus, fusiform/hippocampus, posterior cingulate
ortex, precuneus and temporal pole. SO produced a signiﬁcant
ffect in the right inferior parietal lobe, right middle frontal gyrus,
nferior frontal gyrus, and the cerebellum bilaterally (see Table 3).
.2.4. Group by Order interaction
There was a signiﬁcant Group by Order interaction in the ante-ior PFC (right superior frontal gyrus, BA10;MNI coordinates xyz, 26
4 6; Z score 3.19). High PP individuals showed greater activation
or SO in that region relative to the lowPPgroup, than for FO (Fig. 3).
n short, the differences between groups in the anterior medial PFC
ere highest for SO mentalizing.
able 4
rain regions showing signiﬁcant group differences during second order trials relative to
Group contrast and area Z score
High PP> low PP
R Inferior frontal gyrus 3.64
L Inferior frontal gyrus 2.94
R Superior medial gyrus 3.36
L Middle frontal gyrus 3.24
R Middle frontal gyrus 3.11
R Precentral gyrus 3.66
ctivations were signiﬁcant at a threshold of p<0.05, cluster-level corrected for multiple
, right.onse in a whole-brain analysis of the interaction between Group (low PP, high PP)
ponse levelswith conﬁdence intervals. Subjectswith high psychosis proneness (PP)
bjects with low PP. Activations were signiﬁcant at p<0.05, cluster-level corrected
Further prefrontal regions of greater activation in high PP for SO
mentalizing were identiﬁed in the lateral PFC bilaterally (middle
frontal gyrus, inferior frontal gyrus, BA9/46), and the right dorso-
medial PFC (superior medial gyrus, BA9) (Table 4 and Fig. 4).
Given that RT were shorter for PHY than for the COG and AFF
conditions, we sought to examine whether the observed effects at
the neural level were reﬂecting generic task difﬁculty. To this end,
we run the analyses including RT as covariate in the SPM design.
The results did not change, with signiﬁcant effects still observed
within the same clusters (albeit of slightly smaller spatial extent),
corrected for multiple comparisons.
Finally, we tested the hypothesis that SO trials would be more
demanding than FO trials at the neural level (Samson, 2009). To
this end, we examined the effects of FO>SO [(FOCOG+FOAFF) >
(SOCOG+SOAFF)] andSO>FO[(SOCOG+SOAFF) > (FOCOG+FOAFF)]








comparisons. Coordinates are in Montreal Neurologic Institute (MNI) space. L, left;






























tig. 4. Images showing activation location and extent in each region in which su
econd order mentalizing than for ﬁrst order mentalizing, relative to subjects with
eak voxel. Activations were signiﬁcant at p<0.05, cluster-level corrected for mu
edial prefrontal cortex; MFG: middle frontal gyrus; SMedG: superior medial gyru
cross groups, using the same factorial design. This revealed, across
roups, stronger activation of a large right-sided cluster including
oxels within the middle frontal gyrus and the inferior frontal
yrus (BA9/46) for SO>FO (peak MNI coordinates xyz=48, 36, 30;
score =7.37, size =1500). There were no PFC regions showing
ncreased activation in FO trials relative to SO trials.
. Discussion
Thepresent study examined theneural circuitry underlying the-
ry of mind in individuals with high positive-dimension psychosis
roneness, following the hypothesis that alterations thereof might
e associated with vulnerability to psychosis (Bora et al., 2009;
elson et al., 2009). We report that subjects with high PP showed
ifferences in brain activation in a number of prefrontal cerebral
reas during second order mentalizing relative to the comparison
roup.
Individuals with high positive-dimension PP recruited a region
ithin the anterior PFC (BA 10) to a greater extent for SO trials
han for FO trials relative to controls. A recent review of anatom-
cal and brain imaging studies that have looked into the function
f BA10 underscored its crucial role in integrating the outcomes of
woormore separate cognitive operations in the pursuit of a higher
ehavioral goal (Ramnani&Owen, 2004). Secondordermentalizing
as a priori expected to entail higher demands than FO mentaliz-ng across groups (Samson, 2009). Both FO and SO trials involved
he processing of language (verbal cue), eye gaze (Jan’s), and men-
alizing (about Jan). Nevertheless, SO trials placed higher demands
n working memory and attention, as not only Jan’s cues had to be
aken into account but also those of the other faces on the screen.with high psychosis proneness (PP) exhibited signiﬁcantly greater activation for
P. Graphs represent mean BOLD response levels with conﬁdence intervals in each
comparisons. IFG: inferior frontal gyrus; LPFC: lateral prefrontal cortex; medPFC:
Indeed, SO trials relative to FO trials induced increased PFC activa-
tion (right middle and inferior frontal gyri) across groups. In this
light, the observed between-group differences on the neural level
suggest that, although SO trials placed higher demands on PFC than
FO trials, high PP subjects required greater effort to reach equiva-
lent performance during SO mentalizing. Given the role ascribed
to BA10, our results suggest that high PP subjects needed greater
activity to integrate separate cognitive operations in order to cor-
rectly mentalize.
This result is in accordance with Marjoram, Job, et al.’s (2006)
ﬁndings in high-risk relatives of schizophrenia patients. The
authors interpreted such increases in PFC activation as evidence
of impaired ToM circuitry due to being at enhanced risk for
schizophrenia, which could require some form of compensa-
tion from additional activity in other brain regions. In addition,
increased PFC activation in subjects with positive-dimension PP is
in line with Mohanty et al.’s (2005) study on affective interference.
Theauthors reported that individualswithhighpositive-dimension
PP showed signiﬁcant (p<0.05) increases in activation indorsal and
ventral lateral PFC, as well as in limbic regions such as the hip-
pocampus and the amygdala, during maintenance of attentional
set in the presence of negative emotional distractors (Emotional
Stroop task),with a sample size similar to ours. Such increaseswere
similarly interpreted as indicative of greater effort/compensatory
mechanism in order to achieve normal behavioral performance.
This is also consistentwithprior results fromour groupof increased
PFC activity in light of equal behavioral performance on an emo-
tion regulation task between subjects with high and low scores on
positive-dimension PP (Modinos, Ormel, & Aleman, 2010). Of note,
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emodynamic response in BA10 during mentalizing tasks relative
o healthy controls (Brunet-Gouet & Decety, 2006).
Additional increases in activation during SO mentalizing in high
ositive-dimension PP were identiﬁed in dorsomedial and lateral
egions of the PFC (BA9/46). Support for the critical role of these
FC areas in ToM processing has been indicated by studies using
entalizing tasks of diverse nature, such as story and cartoon
omprehension, as well as the viewing of real-time interaction
Frith & Frith, 2003; Saxe, Carey, & Kanwisher, 2004). Interest-
ngly, positive psychotic symptomatology in subjects at genetic risk
or psychosis was reported to be associated with activation differ-
nces also located in prefrontal regions, suggesting that psychotic
ymptoms could arise at least in part from deﬁcits in the neural
rchitecture underlying the mentalizing process required by ToM
asks (Marjoram, Job, et al., 2006). Russell et al. (2000) reported that
edicated schizophrenia patients showed less activation inBA9/46
hile making errors in the Eyes Task, in which participants were to
ttribute mental states to photographs of eyes. In light of the lack
f signiﬁcant differences in accuracy scores between our groups,
arallel to the behavioral results in Marjoram, Job, et al.’s (2006),
he presumed compensatory mechanism appears to be working
o a satisfactory extent. An alternative explanation could be that
ncreased activation in high positive-dimension PP reﬂects a ten-
ency to over-mentalize (Frith, 2004). The experimental paradigm
sed herein, however, was not set up to explicitly test for this.
uture studies speciﬁcally designed to this end should provide fur-
her information on this possibility. We found that activity in the
ight precentral gyrus during second ordermentalizingwas greater
n high PP than in low PP. Activity in this region has been associated
ith affective mentalizing (Hooker, Verosky, Germine, Knight, &
’Esposito, 2010). These ﬁndings are in keepingwith recent reports
hat lesions in the ventral motor and premotor cortex are associ-
ted with both emotion recognition deﬁcits and lower than normal
elf-reports of affective empathy (Shamay-Tsoory, Aharon-Peretz,
Perry, 2009).
Prefrontal overactivation associated with adequate perfor-
ance on cognitive tasks had been previously reported in patients
ith schizophrenia (Callicott, Mattay, et al., 2003; Ramsey et al.,
002). Elevated activity in patients was thought to reﬂect a reduc-
ion of the efﬁciency with which the brain regions that constitute a
etwork communicatewith each other (Ramsey et al., 2002). Inter-
stingly, healthy siblings of schizophrenia patients also showed
veractivation of PFC regions associated with adequate perfor-
ance (Callicott, Egan, et al., 2003), which was hypothesized to
eﬂect inefﬁcient prefrontal information processing that increases
he risk for schizophrenia. Our ﬁndings are seemingly consistent
ith this notion. Finally, from a structural point of view, regional
raymatter changes in regionsof thePFChavebeendetected inpro-
romal subjects at clinical risk for psychosis (Nelson et al., 2009),
ending further support to the idea of a critical PFC involvement
arly in the pathophysiology of the disorder.
Patientswithpositive symptomschizophrenia arehypothesized
o abnormally attribute mental states, rather than having a gen-
ine deﬁcit in the representation of mental states such as that in
utism (Corcoran, Mercer, & Frith, 1995; Frith & Corcoran, 1996).
ur sample of subjects with high positive-dimension PP showed
orrect behavioral performance, although we observed differen-
ial activation in ToM-related regions that have also been reported
o show dysfunctional response in schizophrenia patients during
uch mental activity. Brain-behavior dissociations in PP have been
roposed to indicate that the manifest behavioral impairments
een in schizophrenia arise after the persistence of subclinical
sychotic experiencesanddependingon thedegreeofneurobiolog-
cal vulnerability and additional environmental risk (Van Os et al.,
009). This could explain why we did not ﬁnd differences between
ur groups, in contrast to the previous ﬁndings in schizophreniagia 48 (2010) 3715–3724
patients reported by Shamay-Tsoory, Aharon-Peretz, et al. (2006)
and Shamay-Tsoory, Shur, et al. (2006), with the same experimen-
tal task. They reported an impairment in the affective mentalizing
condition. Such ﬁner differentiation between affective and cogni-
tive mental inference deﬁcits might become manifest after illness
onset. It is important to emphasize here that the effects of COG and
AFF might not seem to show much overlap as reported on Table 2
because we are contrasting them to the PHY condition, which was
our control condition designed to rule out task processes unrelated
to mentalizing. Contrasting COG and AFF to a baseline condition
(ﬁxation cross) did produce activation in overlapping regions.
With regard to neuroimaging studies of ToM in schizophre-
nia patients, our ﬁndings ﬁt with the results reported by Brüne
et al. (2008) of greater prefrontal activation in patients (charac-
terized by positive symptoms) as compared to controls. Benedetti
et al. (2009) and Walter et al. (2009) also implied involvement of
frontal regions. Andreasen, Calarge, and O’Leary (2008), in a PET-
study of medication-naive patients compared to healthy controls,
found reduced blood ﬂow in the left frontal cortex but increased
blood ﬂow in the right frontal cortex during a ToM task. However,
not all studies have found frontal abnormalities during ToM tasks
in schizophrenia patients, with one recent study not ﬁnding any
difference at all between patients and controls (Mier et al., 2010).
Other studies reporteddifferences in temporal areas (e.g., Benedetti
et al., 2009; Brunet-Gouet & Decety, 2006). Indeed, although the
PFC is regarded as a key player in social cognition, other regions
havebeen involved in thementalizingnetwork, suchas thesuperior
temporal sulcus and the temporal poles,which are thought to serve
more general functions in ToM processing (Amodio & Frith, 2006).
Despite the absence of signiﬁcant between-group differences in
activation of temporal regions, the within-group analysis revealed
that they were indeed consistently activated across groups during
mentalizing. Activation of the temporal poles has been associated
with episodicmemory retrieval in the auditory and verbal domains
(Gallagher & Frith, 2003), and it has been suggested that these
regions may hold memories for social scripts (Frith & Frith, 2003),
which are required to access social knowledge to aid interpretation
of social situations. Hence, it is possible that the appreciation of
cartoon images does not require these episodic memories of social
scripts to the extent of other ToM paradigms, particularly verbal
stories.
A limitation of our study is that it did not include other
established measures of ToM, which may have allowed a more
comprehensive exploration of putative abnormalities in the high
PP group. Nevertheless, the task used herein has been validated
before and has been shown to be positively correlated with verbal
measures of ToM such as false belief stories (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, &
Frith, 1985), which indicates that they measure similar ToM com-
ponents (Shamay-Tsoory & Aharon-Peretz, 2007). With regard to
the study sample, this study was conﬁned to subjects with high
scores on positive-dimension psychosis proneness, and suggests
that they show differential activation of neural systems underlying
ToM. However, the present study was not originally designed to
test the viability of the trait-marker hypothesis. As recommended
by Pousa et al. (2008), longitudinal studies including individuals
from both positive and negative dimension PP may help elucidate
whether the activation differences occur in association with pos-
itive subclinical experiences. Another potential limitation of the
present study is that the subjects were recruited from a univer-
sity sample, thus caution should be used when extrapolating the
present ﬁndings to the general population. Of note, students func-
tion at a high level (Meehl, 1962), thus psychosis-prone individuals
withhigh intellectual capacitymight copebetterwith theproblems
associated with PP (Romme, Honig, Noorthoorn, & Escher, 1992;
Van’t Wout et al., 2004). This could account at least in part for the
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ate students is a common strategy that enhances homogeneity of
he sample and is consistent with previous studies in psychometri-
ally identiﬁed psychosis proneness (e.g., Fernyhough et al., 2008;
angdon & Coltheart, 1999, 2001, 2004; Platek & Gallup, 2002). We
id not include a measure of IQ, as one would not expect major
ntelligencedifferencesbetweengroups selected froma larger sam-
le of healthy subjects at the university level. In addition, ToM
eﬁcits in high positive-dimension PP have been reported to be
ndependent of IQ functioning (Pickup, 2006). On the other hand,
Q is a relevant variable when it comes to theory of mind per-
ormance and therefore future studies incorporating a measure
f IQ should further illuminate this issue. An advantage of stud-
es in PP is that there is no interference of cognitive impairment
ith task performance, which may be problematic in patient pop-
lations. Finally, the investigation of subjects with negative- or
isorganized-dimension PP fell out of the scope of the present
xperiment. However, further studies into the relation between
oM and other PP dimensions should further expand our ﬁndings.
In conclusion, the present study provides evidence of differ-
nces in neural activation of prefrontal regions during theory of
ind processing between individuals with high and low positive-
imensionpsychosisproneness. Theseﬁndings convergewithprior
vidence for the notion that alterations in ToM circuitry may be
ssociatedwith vulnerability to psychosis. Thus, the present results
uggest that such alterationsmay reﬂect pathophysiologicalmech-
nisms at play, rather than developing uniquely as a result of illness
hronicity or long-term anti-psychotic medication.
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